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Abstract 
We study the evolution of industrial concentration in twelve manufacturing 
sectors in Indian industry over the period 1970-99. Our aim is to examine the impact 
of economic liberalisation on concentration. Given the strong regulation of Indian 
industry till the mid 1980s, the market structure in most industries was largely an 
product of government policy. With deregulation, we might expect the pattern of 
concentration to be determined by the interaction between the technological 
characteristics of the industry and what we might call the normal competitive 
processes. 
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1 Introduction 
The economic reforms of 1991 are often seen as a watershed in the management of 
Indian industry. Through much of the 1960s and 1970s Indian industry was highly 
regulated and protected. Most formal manufacturing sectors were subject to licensing 
requirements and capacity controls. Many sectors were reserved for the public sector 
or for small-scale firms. Controls on imports and tariffs protected Indian industry 
from foreign competition. In a process that arguably began in the 1980s, but gained 
prominence after 1991, Indian industry has been progressively deregulated and 
exposed to domestic and foreign competition. In this paper we study the impact of this 
liberalisation on patterns of industrial concentration in Indian manufacturing. 
In the regulated phase the pattern of industrial concentration was a direct outcome 
of industrial policy. Early regulation was guided by a perceived need to conserve 
scarce capital: in order to prevent ‘unnecessary duplication of investment’, in many 
sectors production licenses were restricted to a handful of firms. Market shares were 
determined largely, though not entirely, by capacity allocations at the level of 
individual firms and plants.  Sectors subject to such licensing requirements and 
capacity regulations were, quite often, relatively concentrated. On the other hand 
some sectors were reserved for small-scale firms to support higher levels of 
employment: if firms were required to be below some size, these sectors would have 
been relatively fragmented. With deregulation, we might expect the pattern of 
concentration to be determined by the interaction between the technological 
characteristics of the industry and what we might call the normal competitive 
processes. 
How does competition affect the levels of industrial concentration? The traditional 
‘size-structure relationship’ contends that industries in which the size of the market is 
large relative to setup costs, competitive entry would result in a fragmented market 
structure. Sutton (1991, 1998) pointed out that for industries that were technology-
intensive or advertising-intensive this simple relationship may break down: If larger 
markets create incentives for a competitive escalation of advertising and technology 
expenditures, the heightened level of such expenditures may preclude fragmentation. 
Thus the pattern of industrial concentration in unregulated markets might be sensitive 
to a range of variables: notably, setup costs, advertising expenditure and technology 
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expenditures of firms. Relying on the framework developed by Sutton, we refer to 
these factors collectively as the ‘sunk cost variables’. 
We study the pattern of concentration for a cross-section of 53 manufacturing 
sectors of Indian manufacturing over the period 1980-99.  For a subset of twelve 
manufacturing sectors (for which a longer time series was available), we also study 
the evolution of concentration over the period 1970-99. Studying concentration is of 
interest because it is indicative, at least in unregulated markets, of the degree of 
market power of firms. If indeed the above sunk costs variables influence 
concentration levels in unregulated markets, we would expect these variables to 
become more significant in the post-liberalisation phase. The greater role of these 
variables may well lead to a decrease in industrial concentration in some sectors, but 
could result in higher levels of concentration in advertising- and technology-intensive 
industries. 
Industrial concentration in India was definitely affected by these policy changes. 
However we find that the crucial determinants of changes in concentration differ 
across industries.  This suggests that the nature of competition differs across sectors, 
which may imply the need for sector-specific competition policies. We also assess the 
importance of industry specific differences in competition and ‘behavioural’ 
differences in competition due the strategic conduct of firms as the policy 
environment changed competitive rules within an industry.   
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on concentration and outlines the liberalisation of industrial policy in India.  
Section 3 describes our data and methodology.  Section 4 discusses our empirical 
findings and Section 5 concludes with a summary of our findings and their 
implications for the design of future industrial policy. 
 
2.   Factors influencing concentration 
Industrial concentration refers to the extent to which production is concentrated 
amongst firms in an industry. For unregulated industries, a long-standing and 
plausible approach relates concentration levels to setup costs in that industry. The 
latter refers to the cost of setting up a plant of minimum efficient scale, which is 
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determined primarily by the technology in use in that industry. If the size of the 
market (say, the average level of demand) can support only a handful of firms 
operating at minimum efficient scale, the equilibrium structure would be relatively 
concentrated. Larger markets can accommodate more firms of efficient size, and so 
would be more fragmented. As Sutton (1991) has pointed out, this size-structure 
relationship may be tempered by the intensity of price competition in an industry. In 
industries where price competition is very intense, profit margins are lower, and firms 
may be unable to recoup the setup costs. Such intense price competition would make a 
fragmented market structure harder to sustain. Consequently, equilibrium levels of 
concentration are likely to be higher. 
The size-structure relation may even break down in industries in which advertising 
and technology play an important role. Suppose the nature of the industry or product 
is such that firms have an incentive to increase such expenditures to gain market 
shares. In the long run, the increased level of expenditures is sustainable only if 
profitability is high enough. Relatively fragmented market structures are unlikely to 
sustain such high levels of profitability, resulting in the creation of a more 
concentrated structure through gradual exit and consolidation of firms. To the extent 
the level of advertising and technology expenditure is endogenous to the market 
structure, larger market size may be associated with an escalation of sunk costs in 
advertising or technology expenditures, with no concomitant reduction in 
concentration.  
Thus, Sutton’s framework offers some theoretical insights regarding the 
relationship between market size and market structure. For industries in which 
advertising and technology do not play a major role, concentration is likely to be a 
decreasing function of market size, measured relative to setup costs. However, in 
industries where technology and/or advertising matter, the size-structure relationship 
is more complex. Sutton’s analysis is more nuanced than this casual summary 
suggests, but it helps us to identify the variables that may be relevant to the 
determination of industrial structure: apart from the technologically-given setup costs, 
the endogenously-determined level of advertising expenditures and technology 
expenditures all affect industrial concentration. In keeping with Sutton’s terminology, 
we will refer to these as the ‘sunk-cost variables’. 
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Our argument is that, given the tight regulatory framework prior to liberalization, 
these factors were unlikely to have mattered much in the determination of 
concentration. After liberalisation, the emergence of a broadly competitive 
environment created greater scope for advertising and expenditure on technology. To 
understand this, we review the changes in the policy environment in India. 
 
Industrial and economic policy in India 
Planned industrial development in India incorporated substantial control of industry. 
The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 reserved certain industries for the public 
sector, by prohibiting the entry of private-sector firms (examples include steel 
manufacture, aviation, petrochemicals). This was deemed necessary to release 
resources for public sector investment in the core sectors of the economy. The 
strategy of planned development ran into unforeseen crises (foreign exchange crises, 
two wars, two droughts). Industrial policy was quite reactive in the 1960s, but 
somewhat perversely moved towards more restriction to mitigate the visible 
symptoms of these crises. For instance, the foreign exchange crises paved the way for 
the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (1973). The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act aimed to control the perceived abuse of the licensing system by the big 
business houses. These changes are detailed in Table la below. 
 
(Tables 1a&b) 
 
 
By the mid-1980s, a long period of industrial stagnation, especially technological 
stagnation, created pressure for deregulation. As early as 1984, there was some 
limited liberalization of industrial policy and import policy. The New Industrial 
Policy in 1991 carried this process further. Table 1b shows that many of these changes 
reversed the earlier restrictive policies. It is interesting that unlike the previous crises 
that had led to a more restrictive environment, the crises of the late 1980s led to 
liberalization.  
The early regulation affected the pattern of industrial concentration through a 
variety of channels. The licensing regime governed the entry and exit of firms as well 
as the level of production capacity. Allocated licenses were extremely particular in 
terms of product specification of what could be manufactured. There was no 
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mechanism for the exit of inefficient or unprofitable firms. The Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 imposed additional restrictions on large 
business houses, dampening the tendency towards growing concentration in some 
sectors.  
Some sectors were reserved for the small-scale sector, in order to mitigate the 
perverse consequences of capital-intensive industrialization in a labour-surplus 
economy. While only a few industries were so reserved initially -- the Third Five-
Year Plan (1961-66) listed only nine – by the late 1970s, the scope of the small scale 
sector had expanded to cover most products that could be produced in the small scale 
sector. Given that small firms risked losing their preferential status if they expanded 
output, its implications for concentration were obvious. According to Gang (1995) 
three sectors --- mechanical engineering, chemical products and auto ancillaries – 
accounted for most of the small firms. In these sectors, the regulatory regime created 
artificially low levels of concentration.  
In some cases, a dualistic structure emerged with some large firms and a fringe of 
small producers, with little movement between categories of firms. Where sectors 
were reserved for small-scale manufacture, but incumbent firms were allowed to 
continue at frozen capacities (e.g. in the soap industry), such a dualistic structure was 
the natural outcome.  
On the whole, the pattern of concentration during the regulated phase was a 
product of government design rather than market forces. Not surprisingly, 
deregulation changed things. The early deregulation of the 1980s introduced ‘broad-
banding’ of production licenses: this change allowed firms to use their existing 
licensed capacity (previously tied to a narrow product specification) to manufacture a 
broader range of related product. Though licensing requirements were formally 
retained, they were granted more easily. The later New Economic Policy of 1991 
abandoned formal licensing requirements in most but not all industrial sectors. These 
changes facilitated fresh entry in some sectors, lowering concentration levels. In 1985, 
the government introduced legislation to enable the exit of inefficient or 'sick' (i.e., 
chronically unprofitable) firms, which increased concentration in other sectors. 
Overall liberalization created an environment in which market structure was fashioned 
more by market forces than government policy. 
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Levels of concentration in Indian industry were also influenced by the policy 
towards foreign investment and imports. In the wake of the foreign exchange crises of 
the 1960s, the economic regime became relatively hostile to new investment by 
foreign firms. This tended to preserve the relatively concentrated structure in some 
industries that were dominated by incumbent foreign firms (see Athreye and Kapur, 
2001). Imports were restricted through licensing and tariffs, ostensibly to conserve 
foreign exchange and provide protection to the fledgling industries. Prior to 1978, 
import licenses were the preferred mode and they were issued on the basis of the twin 
criteria of 'essentiality' and 'domestic non-availability'. Domestic availability was 
judged without reference to price, and with the broad based growth of manufacturing, 
it became relatively difficult to meet this non-availability criterion. Tariff policy acted 
to complement these quantitative restrictions.  At an average rate of 122%, tariffs in 
India in the late-1980s were higher than most other countries.1 Tariffs insulated many 
sectors from price competition: this allowed many inefficient firms to survive, and 
may have supported a more fragmented structure relative to what stronger price 
competition may have created.   
With import liberalisation, tariff levels fell (see Table 1b for major policy 
changes). This lowered the costs of capital good or embodied technology imports. 
Changes in the patent laws and the relaxation of restrictions on royalty payments led 
to a marked increase in technology expenditures.  
Of course, deregulation may increase or decrease the level of concentration. In 
sectors where deregulation allowed the incumbent firms to increase their market 
dominance, concentration could increase. In other sectors, deregulation may have 
eroded the advantages of incumbency, resulting in lower concentration. Hence, a 
cross-section study might identify such effects. Further, the impact of deregulation 
even within a sector may be complicated: for instance, concentration may rise in the 
early stages of deregulation and then fall over time. Our results suggest that this may 
be the case in established industries as well. Consider for instance the passenger car 
industry. Till the early 1980s the Indian passenger car industry was an effective 
duopoly, with the two large manufacturers, Premier Automobiles and Hindustan 
Motors. In the early 1980s, Maruti Udyog was set up (as a public sector firm in 
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collaboration with Suzuki of Japan). Maruti imported technology (and, for a while, 
even the cars, in the form of knocked-down kits). Given that Maruti cars were 
technologically-superior to the models sold by the incumbents, Maruti acquired a 
dominant share in the market very quickly. However, as a consequence of further 
liberalisation, other manufacturers entered too: now a proliferation of models has 
been accompanied by a reduction in concentration. 
It is tempting to relate changes in concentration directly to the key policy changes 
(say the policies on entry or exit, for instance). However we view deregulation as 
enabling concentration levels to approach their ‘equilibrium’ values, and these are 
determined by a host of factors. In particular, we look at how the effect of policy 
changes was mediated through their impact on the ‘sunk cost’ variables. For instance, 
rather than relate changing concentration levels in the passenger car industry to policy 
changes directly, we aim to study how policy changes affected the strategic behaviour 
of firms in this sector.  Notably, technology intensity rose sector-wide after 1980; the 
proliferation of models has been accompanied by increased marketing expenditures. 
As the industry adapted to modern assembly lines, set-up costs for new entrants rose. 
In this paper, we study the relationship between concentration and these sunk-cost 
variables, both across and within various manufacturing sectors. 
 
3. Empirical methodology 
3.1 The econometric model 
The econometric model aims to model changes in concentration across industries and 
overtime.  We follow existing empirical studies in modelling changes in concentration 
as an adaptive process. Let itC denote the concentration level in industry i in period t.  
*
, 1( )it i it i t itC C Cλ ε−∆ = − + , where      (1) 
* 'it i i it iC W tα β γ= + +      
                                                                                                                                            
1 Estimates from World Bank (1989) 
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Concentration levels adjust towards their equilibrium value, *itC . Here iλ  is the partial 
adjustment coefficient ( 0 1)iλ≤ ≤ ), and itε is the usual error term. In this 
specification, equilibrium concentration depends, apart from the industry-specific 
intercept, iα , and time trend, itγ , on a vector of sunk cost variables. We have 
i it ik iktk
W Wβ β′ =∑ .  In our model, we consider three kinds of sunk cost variables, so 
that k=1,2,3. 
The reduced form of the above dynamic model can be written as: 
, 1it i i i i it i i i i t itC W t Cλα λ β λ γ λ ε−′∆ = + + − +  
or 
3
4 5 , 10 1
it i i t iti ki kitk
C W t Cθ θ θ θ ε−== + + + +∑      (2) 
  
Pesaran and Smith (1995) caution against an automatic use of pooled data in dynamic 
estimations, such as (2) above, without ascertaining the degree of heterogeneity in the 
underlying slope coefficients.  They show that in the presence of heterogeneity the 
imposition of the assumption of a single common slope coefficient in the data 
produces inconsistent (and biased) estimates of the slope coefficient.  To ascertain the 
degree of heterogeneity, we estimated equation (2) for twelve industrial sectors for 
which a long time series (1970-99) was available.  We then computed the degree of 
dispersion around the mean of the individual industry regressions (computed as a 
simple average of individual country means) to assess if a panel estimation was 
indicated.   
 
For the twelve industries for which the dynamic model was estimated, the 
structural parameters could also be recovered from the reduced equation (2): we have 
λi = (1- θ5) and βk = (θk /λ). Estimating this equation thus tells us about the influence 
of particular factors in influencing concentration in each industry. The results and the 
recovered values of the structural parameters are contained in Table 5, and discussed 
in Section 4.1.   
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Pesaran and Smith (1995) have also shown that if the parameters are random 
across industry and independent of W, the long-run relationship can be estimated 
from the levels cross-section 
* 'i i iC W uα β= + +         (3) 
where β  is the mean of the iβ , and *α  will reflect average intercept and mean trend 
effect. We do not estimate the dynamic model from the cross-section, because the 
average of the lagged dependent variable is clearly endogenous. Further, if the time 
span of the data is long enough, the average of these cross sectional coefficients do 
provide a consistent estimate of the average long term effect of each of the W factors. 
In the presence of heterogeneity in the underlying slope coefficients, the mean group 
estimator based on (3) may provide a better measure of the long term impact of the 
factors influencing concentration.   
Thus, we estimate 20 cross-section levels regressions (based on (3) above), for 
each year from 1980-99, interpreting them as changing long-run estimates of the 
relationship between concentration and the sunk-cost variables. The estimated β 
coefficients for each period are then plotted in Figures 1- 3.  This exercise reveals 
how the relative influence of various factors influencing concentration across 
industries changed over time, perhaps in response to changes in industrial policy.  We 
also estimate a two way fixed effects model based on (3) writing *α =  αi +   αt  , for 
the entire time span of the data (1970-99) and for the liberalisation period (1985-99).   
3.2 Data and Variables 
We use a longitudinal data set of balance-sheet data, from 1970 to 1999, of publicly-
listed manufacturing companies to estimate our model. The data we use is maintained 
by the Reserve Bank of India and is described in Appendix 1. The data identify an 
industrial sector code for each firm. This allows us to aggregate data across firms for 
any particular industrial sector of interest. Thus, for example, advertising intensity 
would be the sum of advertising expenditures by all firms in the industry as 
percentage of the total sales of the industry. 
The panel of data is however unbalanced and data for several industrial sectors 
started from 1975 or 1978.  We excluded industries that seemed to group together 
 11
firms of different types - other rubber products, other non-ferrous metals - for 
examples.  The full list of the 53 industries included in the cross section analysis is 
detailed in Appendix 1.  For the time-series regressions, we selected twelve industrial 
sectors from the dataset which had data from 1970-99, in which the number of 
reporting firms did not drop to one in any year and a homogenous industry grouping 
of firms.2 For the cross section levels regressions we started from 1980, the year after 
which significant de-regulation took place in industrial policy, and estimated twenty 
different regressions.  Thus, the cross sectional regressions were estimated across 53 
manufacturing sectors and for 20 years.  
The measure of concentration we use as the dependent variable in our empirical 
analysis is the Herfindahl index.  This index is constructed as the squared sum of 
market shares of all firms in any industrial sector. There are alternative measures of 
industrial concentration. The simplest measure would consider the number of active 
firms in the industry. Alternatively, we could have considered the n-firm 
concentration ratio: the share of industry output controlled by the largest n firms. 
Kambhampati (1996), for instance, uses the four-firm concentration ratio. We find 
that the Herfindahl index is more suitable for longer spans of data.3 The dependent 
variable, HERF2 is the value of the index expressed in percentage terms.  The lagged 
value of HERF2 also enters in the dynamic estimations (for each industry over time) 
as an independent variable.  
We included three measures of sunk cost proxying the size-setup ratio, marketing 
intensity and technology intensity of industries.  MKTINT is the industry’s marketing 
intensity measured as the total of all advertising and selling expenses as a percentage 
of industry sales. Firms in our dataset report ‘selling expenses’ separately from 
advertising expenses. The former include sales commissions to retailers, which are 
quite important to maintenance of distribution networks in rural areas and non-
metropolitan settings with poor reach of conventional advertising channels. We use a 
                                                 
2 ADF tests for the time series variables are contained in Appendix 2. 
3 Since the Herfindahl index combines information on the variance of shares and numbers it can be 
decomposed in interesting ways.  Using the same data set, Kambhampati and Kattuman (2003) 
decompose the Herfindahl index into two components: one showing the volatility of market shares and 
the other showing the gain of smaller (fringe) firms.  Our interest is however on studying the influence 
of sunk cost variables upon the Herfindahl index itself.  
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composite term, marketing expenses, to capture all selling costs. Marketing intensity 
is computed as the percentage of these costs to overall industry sales.   
TECHACQ is the industry’s technology acquisition intensity and measured as 
the sum of technology fees and royalties by all firms in the industry as a percentage of 
total industry sales. For many Indian firms, expenditure on technology acquisition is 
often more important than R&D expenditures. We have thus constructed a composite 
measure of technology acquisition costs as a percentage of sales to use instead of 
R&D expenditures.  
SIZSETUP is the ratio of industry sales to average net fixed assets. T refers to 
time, and NUMBER is control variable for the number of reporting firms.  The 
Herfindahl index is quite sensitive to the number of firms included especially in 
sectors where numbers are small or in years when there is a fall in numbers due to 
non-reporting by certain firms. This also affects the calculation of size to set-up costs 
where the denominator is the average of net fixed assets across firms in an industrial 
sector in any one year.  For both these reasons we use the number of reporting firms 
as a control variable for possible measurement errors. 
(Table 2 here) 
Table 2 summarises the variables used in the analysis, and indicates the 
hypothesised sign on the coefficients.  
 
4.  Results 
The first part of our empirical analysis addresses the issue of what causes the 
variability of concentration equation over time: is this variability due to differences in 
the response of firms to the new policies or is it because the new policies favoured 
different industrial sectors differently? Consider our example from the automobile 
sector. Was the variability in concentration in the passenger cars market due to the 
fact that import liberalisation allowed firms like Maruti Udyog and Tatas to import 
technology and so win greater market shares over their competitors, or was it because 
freer imports of technology were always more likely to influence concentration in the 
technology intensive automobiles sector more than, say, in sugar or breweries? 
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To examine this question we decompose the variability in the three W variables 
and in concentration into between and within industry components of variation.  If the 
former component dominates the overall variation then we could say that 
concentration was mostly determined by the changes in the nature of industries.  If the 
latter component dominates then of course we would conclude it was firm strategies 
that changed concentration more. 
(Table 3 here) 
Table 3 reports both the mean values and the between and within variance of the 
variables over the period 1980-99.  Over the liberalisation period, in all cases, the 
between variance dominated the total variance – implying that the differences 
between sectors in concentration and the sunk cost variables was larger than their 
differences over time.   
 
4.1   The dynamic model 
We use time series data for twelve industries. Table 4 reports the descriptive statistics. 
The first row reports the mean value of the dependent variable, averaged over time for 
each of the twelve industries. Concentration ranges from around 4% (for the sugar 
industry) to over 20% for machine tools, and wool textiles. 
( Table 4 here) 
Regression estimates for the dynamic model are reported next in Table 5. 
Looking across the industries, these results suggest that concentration in each industry 
was influenced possibly by factors specific to that industry. Six of the twelve 
industries show a significant time trend in concentration levels. Of these, breweries, 
chemical fertilizers, medicinal preparations and cement show a decreasing time trend 
in concentration while dyes & dye-stuffs and cotton textiles show an increasing trend.  
     (Table 5 here) 
Marketing intensity seems to significantly affect concentration in sugar, auto 
vehicles, machine tools and paper. Indeed, in all except sugar, higher marketing 
intensity is associated with lower concentration. Technology acquisition costs too 
have a significant negative impact on levels of concentration in Jute textiles and 
machine tools. Size set up costs impact concentration positively in woolen textiles, 
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auto-vehicles and machine tools. It has a negative impact on concentration in dyes & 
dyestuffs and medicinal preparations. 
The autoregressive parameter is significant in six of the twelve industries (cotton 
textiles, wool textiles, jute textiles, auto vehicles, chemical fertilisers, and dyes and 
dyestuffs). This suggests that the partial adjustment framework that underlies the 
estimated equation (2) is relevant only in these industrial sectors, and for the others 
this is a misspecification. There are other signs of misspecification in the remaining 
industrial sectors. Autocorrelation in breweries and medicinal preparations suggests 
that the 'right' equation should have more lagged dependent variables as explanatory 
variables. The estimated values of λ for Sugar, medicinal preparations and cement are 
also close to 1, suggesting that a more appropriate dependent variable is the level of 
concentration. 
Overall these results cast serious doubts about the usefulness of pooled or panel 
estimations of equation (2). We used a method described by Boyd and Smith (2000) 
to examine departures from the long-run pooled mean.  As we discussed in Section 3, 
for these twelve industries this can be obtained by averaging the industry coefficients.  
Table 6 reports the deviations of each industry’s coefficient (normalized by the 
standard error of the average mean).   As can be seen some of these deviations are 
very large (greater than 1) especially in the case of marketing intensity and technology 
intensity. A panel estimation imposing a single slope coefficient on the entire panel 
would be inappropriate and would also yield inconsistent (and biased) estimates of the 
common slope coefficient. 
(Table 6 here) 
The interesting question for us is to understand is why there are these different 
patterns across industrial sectors. For some industries, namely cotton textiles and 
brewery, we find that the 'sunk cost' variables are not significant in explaining 
concentration. This is not surprising given that in these sectors government policy 
control has survived in the form of lingering capacity regulation, control over pricing 
or reservation as small-scale industries. Sectors that were liberalized to a greater 
extent (in our sample this includes auto vehicles, machine tools, dyes and paper) 
allowed a much greater play for market forces. Here the sunk cost variables do affect 
levels of concentration. 
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Where the sunk cost variables do have a significant impact upon concentration, 
they often have the wrong sign from that predicted in Table 2. In the immediate 
aftermath of liberalization, we might expect concentration levels to fall as new firms 
enter and at the same time an increase in technology and advertising expenditures as 
firms compete for larger market shares. Of course over a longer run, such heightened 
levels of expenditure may not be sustainable. We would then expect that technology 
and advertising intensive sectors would tend to have growing levels of concentration 
as conventional theory predicts. Many of the industrial sectors in our sample could be 
in the transitional phase, given that liberalisation started in the 1980s and gathered 
pace in the 1990s. 
 
4.2 Cross-section estimates 
Figures 1 to 3 plot the estimated coefficients for MKTINT, TECHAQ, SIZSETUP for 
equation (3), over the period 1980 to 1999.4  The dotted lines denote the confidence 
interval around the mean at two standard errors.  The value of the mean group 
estimator and its standard error is also reported on each figure. The coefficient of 
MKTINT on concentration varies in sign over this period: for of the recent period, its 
value is positive, though it assumed negative values from 1986 to 1991. The mean 
group estimator too has a negative value.  One plausible explanation for this pattern 
may run as follows: the underlying relation between concentration and MKTINT may 
be positive, but the temporarily negative values of the coefficient after the mid-1980s 
reflect a process in which different industries move to a new equilibrium, but at 
different speeds. There was a concomitant widening of the confidence interval 
accompanying these changes.  
(Figures 1-3 here) 
However, the relationship between concentration and TECHINT as seen in Figure 
2 appears to move to a positive relation after 1985.  The mean group estimator too is 
positive.  For SIZSETUP too, the pattern in Figure 3 suggests a transition from mostly 
negative values before 1985 to positive values after that and this is reflected in the 
positive value for the Mean Group estimator. This is what we would expect if the cost 
structure of manufacturing as a whole switched from predominantly exogenous to 
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endogenous sunk costs.  One possibility is that liberalisation enabled easier imports of 
capital goods and technology. 
Interestingly, this explanation lends support to the thesis (see DeLong 2001) that 
the reforms of the mid-1980s were more significant in terms of their impact on 
economic activity than the much-emphasised reforms of 1991.  To test if this is indeed 
the case, we estimated (3) with fixed time and industry effects for the periods 1970-
84, 1985-99, 1991-99 and 1970-99.  The results reported in Table 7 do indeed confirm 
the change in underlying coefficient values after 1985. In particular, the relationship 
between concentration and the size set-up ratio emerges as positive and significant in 
the later period. 
(Table 7 here) 
 
5. Conclusion 
Prior to liberalization, market structure in Indian manufacturing was largely an artifact 
of government policy. This was hardly surprisingly given the nature and extent of 
regulatory control. We would expect deregulation and liberalization to alter the 
picture, though the precise effects could vary across industries. Concentration levels 
may rise or fall depending on the specifics of individual sectors. The dynamic picture 
within individual sectors could be complicated too, as deregulation alters the strategic 
choices of incumbents and enables new entry. This variability suggests the need for a 
sector-specific rather than general examination of the impact of deregulation on 
concentration. Looking across sectors, we also find that concentration was more 
affected by sunk cost variables in the period before 1991 than after.  
The fact that implications of deregulation for concentration differ across sectors 
strongly supports the need for a sector-specific approach to competition policy. While 
this is quite common practice in developed countries, many developing economies 
have yet to develop this approach.  Recent discussions of the Competition Bill suggest 
that India is taking the right path. A second implication suggested by our analysis in 
Section 1 is that policy changes respond to increases in levels of concentration: in that 
sense regulatory policy may have an element of ‘endogeneity’. 
                                                                                                                                            
4 The full estimated equations corresponding to these are available from the authors. 
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Table 1a: Key changes in India’s industrial policy regime, 1950-1980 
 
Industries 
(Development and 
Regulation) Act,  1951 
Specified the Schedule I industries where licenses were required 
for firms with fixed investment above a certain level of 
investment or import content of investment above a certain level 
Companies Act, 1951 Restrictions on the operation of managing agencies, which 
affected the operation of many British companies in India 
Industrial Policy 
Resolution, 1956 
Articulated the role of public investment in planned 
development and specified: 
Schedule A industries reserved exclusively for state enterprises 
Schedule B industries where further expansion would be by state 
enterprises 
Corporate Tax 
policies, 1957-1991  
Specified rates of corporate tax on companies incorporated 
outside India.  These were usually between 15-20% higher than 
the rates applied to large Indian companies during this period. 
Monopolies and 
Restrictive Trade 
Practices Act, 1969 
All applications for a license from companies belonging to a list 
of big business houses and subsidiaries of foreign companies 
were to be referred to a ‘MRTP Commission’ which invited 
objections and held public hearings before granting a license for 
production.   
Industrial Policy 
Notification, 1973  
Made licensing mandatory for all industries above certain 
investment limits 
Specified industry Schedules IV and V , where licensing was 
mandatory for all firms irrespective of size 
Small scale industry reservation introduced for some industries.  
Small was defined based on an investment limit. 
Industrial Policy 
Statement, 1973 
Specified the criteria and list of Appendix I of ‘core’ industries 
to which large business houses and foreign firms were to be 
confined.  Main criteria for being an Appendix 1 industry were 
that of local non-availability or domination of a sector by a 
single foreign firm.  Schedule A industries from IPR, 1956 could 
not figure in the Appendix 1 list. 
Foreign Exchange 
Regulation Act, 1973 
Foreign companies operating in India were required to educe 
their share in equity capital to below 40%.  Exceptions were 
decided on a discretionary basis if: 
The company was engaged in ‘core’ activities ( as defined in 
IPS, 1973) 
The company was using sophisticated technology or 
Met certain export commitments  
Industrial Policy 
Resolution 1977 
Expanded the scope of reservations of particular lines of 
business activity for production in the small scale industrial 
sector.  Small industry concessions would be lost if firm grew to 
a certain ‘large’ size. 
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Table 1b: Key changes in India’s industrial policy regime, 1980-1999 
Policy announcements, 
1985  
Business houses were not restricted to Appendix 1 industries as 
long as they moved to industrially backward regions 
Minimum asset limit defining business houses was raised from 
Rs. 200 million to Rs. 1 billion   
Amendment to MRTP 
Act, 1985 
A company could be referred to the MRTP commission only if it 
showed assets greater than Rs. 1 billion. 
New Industrial Policy 
1991 
Abolished licensing for all except 18 industries. 
Large companies no longer needed MRTP approval for capacity 
expansions 
Number of industries reserved for the public sector in Schedule 
A (IPR1951), cut down from 17 to 8; Schedule B was abolished 
altogether. 
Small firms were allowed to offer upto 24% of shareholding to 
large enterprises. 
Limits on foreign equity holdings were raised from 40 to 51% in 
a wide range of industries and foreign exchange outflows as 
dividends were balanced by export earnings. 
EXIM scrips (import entitlements linked to export earnings) 
were introduced and were freely tradable and could be used for 
all categories of imports. 
Actual user requirements for import of capital goods, raw 
materials and components under OGL were removed. 
Royalty limits increased to encourage technology imports. 
Policy announcements,  
1992-99 
Number of industries requiring licensing steadily decreased.  By 
1998 the number of industries requiring compulsory licensing 
was down to 9.  
Oil exploration and Minerals were removed from list of reserved 
industries for the public sector, bringing the number of Schedule 
A industries down to 6. 
Infrastructure industries like basic telecom and power opened to 
private ownership (including foreign ownership). 
Small scale industry reservations decreased: 15 items including 
ready made garments are removed from reserved list. 
Investment limit for defining a firm as small scale raised from 
Rs. 7.5 million to Rs. 30 million. 
Pricing of coal, drugs and pharmaceuticals de-regulated. 
Tariff reductions, 
1992-99 
Peak tariffs reduced to 110% in 1992 and gradually brought 
down to 40% in 1998. 
List of freely importable goods expanded 
Reform of structure of tariffs. 
 
Source for Table 1: Adapted from Sivadasan, J. (2002), with authors’ additions. 
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Table 2:  Variables used in the analysis and expected coefficient values 
 
Variable  
Name 
Relation to 
Equation 
(2) or (3) 
Description Expected signs  
HERF2 Cit   
HERF2(-1) Cit-1 Lagged value of the Herfindahl 
index 
In equation (2) only 
 (+)  as 0 ≤ λ1 < 1 
MKTINT  W1it Value of industry’s marketing 
intensity; marketing intensity is 
total of all advertising and selling 
expenses as a percentage of 
industry sales 
(+) 
TECHACQ  W2it Value of industry’s technology 
acquisition intensity; technology 
intensity is the sum of royalties 
paid (in rupees and foreign 
currency) + technology fees in 
foreign currency, by all firms in 
the industry as a percentage of 
total industry sales  
(+) 
SIZSETUP  W3it Ratio of industry sales to average 
net fixed assets 
(-) 
But can become 
positive in the 
presence of 
endogenous sunk 
costs 
TIME T  In equation (2) only 
Can take any sign. 
NUMBER Control 
variable 
The number of reporting firms in 
each year, controls for 
measurement errors of right hand 
side variable and spurious 
increases in the Herfindahl index 
due to under-reporting in certain 
years 
(-) . 
Increasing numbers 
of firms decrease 
the Herfindahl 
index and vice 
versa. 
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Table 3: Variability between and within industries (1980-99) 
Variable   Mean Std dev Minimum Maximum 
HERF2 Overall 31.840 26.489 1.101 100.00 
 Between  23.355 2.459 95.512 
 Within  12.393 -10.873 89.051 
MKTINT Overall 1.642 1.647 0.000 12.618 
 Between  1.222 0.127 6.702 
 Within  1.078 -4.429 8.989 
TECHACQ Overall 0.373 1.414 0.000 19.796 
 Between  1.246 0.002 9.138 
 Within  0.770 -5.299 11.030 
SIZSETUP Overall 60.084 94.038 0.502 1112.769 
 Between  71.907 4.553 353.802 
 Within  59.852 -278.842 819.051 
NUMBER Overall 18.112 24.328 1 249 
 Between  20.885 1.367 104.64 
 Within  12.525 -64.221 166.779 
 
Notes: (i) The above figures are estimated by STATA.   
(ii) The between mean is calculated over 53 industrial sectors and is x i.  The within 
mean is calculated as ( xit - x i + x  ) where x  is the global mean computed over 1441 
observations.
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 Table 4: Descriptive statistics, dynamic model (1970-1999) 
Cotton Wool Jute Auto Machine Chemical Variable Sugar 
Textiles Textiles Textiles 
Brewery
Vehicles Tools Fertilisers
Dyes & 
Dyestuffs
Medicinal 
prep. 
Cement Paper 
HERF2             
mean 4.325 6.928 30.458 6.857 20.170 18.058 22.789 15.798 18.462 4.306 16.446 9.611
std devn 1.490 6.082 11.822 2.918 10.686 3.029 4.315 3.141 3.498 0.616 4.099 3.619
Min 2.468 1.100 15.028 3.382 10.131 13.860 16.601 10.289 14.238 3.306 9.875 5.972
max 8.412 20.650 64.255 12.609 47.407 25.048 32.933 20.223 29.237 5.353 23.265 22.186
MKTINT             
mean 0.428 1.472 3.954 0.671 4.449 0.965 2.535 0.464 1.915 3.493 0.692 0.720
std devn 0.106 0.482 0.634 0.129 1.856 0.482 1.051 0.374 0.334 0.629 0.337 0.382
Min 0.241 0.924 2.956 0.414 2.250 0.312 1.019 0.120 1.136 2.612 0.325 0.294
max 0.693 3.175 5.508 0.844 11.780 2.871 4.197 1.457 2.569 5.198 1.506 1.529
TECHACQ            
mean 0.076 0.117 0.076 0.019 0.492 0.323 0.366 0.481 0.073 0.144 0.548 0.112
std devn 0.067 0.225 0.151 0.032 0.585 0.194 0.369 0.632 0.079 0.186 0.326 0.135
Min 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
max 0.254 0.898 0.758 0.118 2.020 0.680 1.811 3.251 0.378 0.671 1.120 0.540
SIZSETUP            
mean 147.242 353.802 23.518 110.940 56.968 61.430 33.147 29.651 31.187 269.186 35.794 57.521
std devn 76.489 359.291 18.417 87.842 27.600 20.653 6.986 9.383 8.113 54.368 10.864 17.366
Min 30.965 14.877 6.084 20.850 16.772 34.941 21.110 12.222 17.378 162.130 16.762 36.923
max 270.574 1112.769 79.130 258.207 102.157 117.426 51.915 47.505 48.770 393.362 62.329 98.481
NUMBER             
mean 45.900 100.333 8.330 24.867 19.467 19.933 11.433 18.433 12.800 63.333 24.967 39.533
std devn 14.947 78.171 1.971 10.708 4.769 6.948 1.073 4.790 2.398 11.050 9.661 9.515
Min 20.000 18.000 5.000 12.000 11.000 13.000 10.000 12.000 9.000 52.000 15.000 25.000
max 70.000 249.000 13.000 42.000 28.000 34.000 13.000 29.000 16.000 89.000 45.000 62.000
 
Notes to Table 4:  The industry group Cotton textiles was re-classified into finer categories in later years.  The number of firms in initial 
years is thus quite large – 249 reporting firms from 1970-75, 113 reporting firms from 1975-80 and 91 reporting firms thereafter.  
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Table 5: Time series estimations for twelve industry groups (1970-99) 
Variable Sugar Cotton 
Textiles 
Wool 
Textiles 
Jute 
Textiles 
Brewery Auto 
Vehicles 
Machine 
Tools 
Chemical 
Fertilisers
Dyes & 
Dyestuffs
Medicinal 
prep. 
Cement Paper 
Constant 7.096*** -12.352*** 28.667** 15.651*** 57.732*** 23.782*** 39.408*** 24.821*** 19.773*** 7.812*** 25.222*** 16.455** 
MKTINT 2.706** 0.857 3.053 -1.512 -0.026 -1.767*** -1.364** -1.706 -0.772 -0.204 -0.081 -4.422* 
TECHACQ -2.472 0.841 1.616 -9.689* 1.610 0.872 -3.359*** -0.270 -11.576 0.384 3.674*** -9.135 
SIZSETUP 0.001 0.006 0.332* 0.005 -0.035 0.120*** 0.223*** -0.030 -0.201*** -0.003* -0.053 0.060 
HERF2 0.006 0.094*** 0.684** 0.048* -0.021 0.069*** 0.214 -0.019* 0.405*** -0.021 0.026 0.237 
TIME 0.032 0.891*** 0.007 -0.039 -0.600*** -0.022 0.005 -0.319** 0.167** -0.055** -0.318*** 0.112* 
NUMBER -0.097*** 0.013 -4.575** -0.318*** -1.364*** -0.638*** -2.134*** -0.103 -0.211 -0.016 -0.174** -0.258* 
Structural parameters            
λ 0.994 0.906 0.316 0.952 1.021 0.931 0.786 1.019 0.595 1.021 0.974 0.763 
β1i 2.722 0.946 9.662 -1.588 -0.025 -1.897 -1.736 -1.674 -1.299 -0.200 -0.083 -5.799 
β2i -2.487 0.928 5.113 -10.178 1.577 0.937 -4.274 -0.265 -19.468 0.376 3.770 -11.980 
β3i 0.006 0.104 2.165 0.050 -0.021 0.074 0.273 -0.019 0.682 -0.021 0.026 0.311 
Diagnostics             
R-squared 0.924 0.904 0.935 0.935 0.899 0.747 0.785 0.736 0.652 0.775 0.874 0.460 
Adjusted R-squared 0.904 0.879  0.918 0.918 0.873 0.681 0.730 0.667 0.562 0.716 0.842 0.319 
S.E. of regression 0.461 2.113 3.394 0.835 3.812 1.710 2.244 1.811 2.315 0.328 1.631 2.987 
Sum squared resid 4.894 102.721 265.008 16.035 334.304 67.237 115.851 75.454 123.314 2.479 61.177 205.187 
F-statistic 46.602 36.203 54.793 55.211 34.138 11.341 14.035 10.702 7.197 13.184 26.698 26.698 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Autocorrelation             
Durbin-Watson  1.604 1.871 1.315 1.825 0.586 2.140 1.385 1.488 1.800 1.152 0.780 1.950 
LM test 
F-statistic 
0.421 1.540 0.913 0.071 13.741*** 1.624 1.022 1.204 0.085 3.132** 0.128 0.139 
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Table 6: Dispersion of industry coefficients around mean value 
Cotton Wool Jute Auto Machine Chemical Variable Sugar 
Textiles Textiles Textiles
Brewery
Vehicles Tools Fertilisers
Dyes & 
Dyestuffs
Medicinal 
prep. 
Cement Paper 
MKTINT             
Average value -0.722           
Standard error 2.033            
Z-values 3.061 1.212 3.408 -1.157 0.329 -1.412 -1.009 -1.351 -0.417 0.151 0.274 -4.067 
TECHACQ    
Average value -2.276    
Standard error 5.100    
Z-values -2.026 1.287 2.062 -9.243 2.057 1.319 -2.913 0.177 -11.130 0.830 4.120 -8.689 
SIZSETUP    
Average value 0.035    
Standard error 0.138    
Z-values -0.253 -0.248 0.077 -0.249 -0.289 -0.135 -0.032 -0.285 -0.456 -0.258 -0.308 -0.195 
 
Notes: Computed from Table 5.
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Table 7: Change in the long-term relationship between concentration and sunk 
cost variables 
 
 Coefficient S.Error significance
1970-84, N*T=649 
constant 38.18 3.07 *** 
MKTINT 0.98 0.41 ** 
TECHACQ 3.07 1.01 *** 
SIZSETUP 0.00 0.01
NUMBER -0.08 0.07
Residual sum of squares 47949.38
F (70, 578) 73.46 *** 
1985-99, N*T=792 
constant 34.60 3.04 *** 
MKTINT -0.14 0.40
TECHACQ 2.96 0.41 *** 
SIZSETUP 0.04 0.02 * 
NUMBER -0.44 0.09 *** 
Residual sum of squares 74803.43
F (70, 721) 63.48 *** 
1991-99, N*T=474  
constant 38.37 3.55 *** 
MKTINT -0.078 0.51  
TECHACQ 2.80 0.50 *** 
SIZSETUP 0.10 0.03 *** 
NUMBER -0.81 0.16 *** 
Residual sum of squares 36888.74  
F (64, 409) 50.91 *** 
1970-99, N*T=1441 
constant 36.49
MKTINT 0.73 0.30 ** 
TECHACQ 2.89 0.43 *** 
SIZSETUP 0.27 0.11 ** 
NUMBER -0.28 0.05 *** 
Residual sum of squares 198829.70
F (85,1355) 65.07
Notes:  
(i) The panel is unbalanced and we estimated equation (3) as a fixed effects 
model with industry and time effects, but do not report the time and 
industry dummies here.  
(ii) Estimations done in STATA,  wit the following syntax 
 
xi: regress herf2 mktint techaq sizsetup number i.sic i.year
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Appendix 1:  A note on the firm level data used in the analysis 
 
The Reserve Bank of India conducts censuses of the public and private limited 
companies at periodic intervals (typically every 5 years). We rely here on these 
unpublished data on medium and large non-government, non-financial, public limited 
companies (i.e. those quoted on the stock exchange). Summary statistics based on this data 
are published periodically as reports on the Finances of Medium and Large Public Limited 
Companies. The coverage of industrial sectors is not complete as the Annual Survey of 
Industries. The exclusion of small firms is not a serious omission: except in a handful of 
sectors (e.g. leather) they are unlikely to be the principal competitors of publicly listed 
firms. The exclusion of government-owned companies is more serious as, over time, they 
came to contribute a substantial fraction of manufacturing output in the economy. The 
exclusion of 'unlisted' companies misses out firms such as the automobile giant Maruti 
Udyog Ltd (owned by Suzuki, Japan and the Government of India).  
The data is longitudinal and, as available for the period 1965-2001 as a sequence of 
surveys. For confidentiality of financial data, companies are identified by a company code 
rather than company names. Firms are assigned to a three-digit industry code based on their 
primary activity. Reporting of firms is not uniform across all years and so the number of 
firms in an industry also fluctuates due to reporting.  The cross-section analysis used data 
on 53 industry groups.  Industries that appeared to be miscellaneous groupings were 
deliberately excluded. The industry coverage of data improves in later years and complete 
data for all industries are available from 1983.  
 
 
Table A1: List of 53 industries used in the cross section regressions 
 
Industry code Description 
310 Grains and Pulses 
320 Edible vegetable and hydrogenated oils 
331 Sugar 
341 Cigarettes 
342 Tobacco ( other than cigarettes) 
351 Cotton textiles (spinning) 
352 Cotton textiles (weaving) 
353 Cotton textiles( composite) 
354 Other cotton textiles 
355 Jute textiles 
356 Silk and Rayon textiles ( spinning) 
357 Silk & Rayon textiles (weaving) 
358 Silk &Rayon  textiles( composite) 
359 Woollen textiles 
360 Ginning pressing and other textile products 
370 Breweries and distilleries 
380 Leather & leather products 
410 Iron & Steel 
420 Aluminium 
441 Auto vehicles 
442 Automobile components 
443 Railway equipment 
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445 Cables 
446 Dry cells 
447 Electric lamps 
449 Machine tools 
450 Textile machinery 
452 Steel tubes and pipes 
453 Steel wire ropes 
454 Steel forgings 
456 Aluminium ware 
461 Chemical fertilisers 
462 Dyes and dyestuffs 
463 Man made fibres 
464 Plastic raw materials 
466 Medicines and pharmaceutical preparations 
467 Paints, varnishes and allied products 
469 Industrial and medical gases 
470 Matches 
510 Mineral Oils 
521 Cement ( hydraulic) 
522 Asbestos and asbestos cement products 
531 Structural clay products 
532 Ceramics 
541 Tyres and tubes 
551 Paper 
552 Products of pulp and board 
553 Wood products, furniture and fixtures 
561 Glass containers 
571 Printing 
572 Publishing 
573 Printing, publishing and allied activities 
580 Plastic products 
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Appendix 2:  Order of integration, I(p), of the variables: summary of ADF tests 
 
Industry Model: 
Intercept 
only 
   Model: 
Trend and intercept
  
 HERF2 MKTINT TECHACQ SIZSETUP HERF2 MKTINT TECHACQ SIZSETUP
Sugar I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) 
Cotton Textiles I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) 
Woollen Textiles I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) I(0) I(1) I(1) 
Jute textiles I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) 
Breweries I(0) I(1)  I(4) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
Auto Vehicles I(0) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) 
Machine Tools I(4) I(1) I(0) I(0) I(2) I(0) I(0) I(1) 
Chemical Fertilisers I(1) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) 
Dyes and Dyestuffs I(0) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(2) 
Medicinal 
preparations 
I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(0) I(2) I(2) 
Cement I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(0) 
Paper I(0) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(2) 
Printing, Publishing 
& allied activities 
I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) I(0) I(1) I(1) I(1) 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Change in coefficient on marketing intensity (eqaution 3) overtime
[Mean group estimator = -0.463, Std error= 2.13]
-10
-5
0
5
10
1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
year
c
o
e
f
f
i
c
e
n
t
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
Figure 2: Change in coefficient on technological intensity (equation 3) overtime
[Mean group Estimator= 2.18, Standard Error=2.047]
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Figure 3: Change in coefficent on the ratio of market size to set-up costs (equation 3) overtime
[ Mean Group estimate=0.084, Standard error=0.135]
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